Rechercher sur ce blogue

mercredi 8 avril 2026

C'est le policier qui prend la décision d'arrêter qui doit disposer de motifs raisonnables, et non celui qui se contente d'exécuter l'ordre / En règle générale, il n'est pas nécessaire que l'information fournie par un informateur soit confirmée sur le plan « criminel »

Czajkowski c. R., 2013 QCCA 1311

Lien vers la décision


[17]        The respondent acknowledges that the police officers arrested the occupants of the vehicle and did not detain them solely for investigative purposes. Accordingly, the prosecution concedes that the trial judge erred in law by using the "reasonable grounds to suspect" standard instead of the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard. However, this error, in my view, is of no consequence since the arrest, even when considered under the higher standard, was valid in the circumstances of this case.

[18]        The appellant submits that only the information possessed by Detective Paquin at the time of his arrest should be considered for the purpose of ascertaining whether there were reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant had committed or was about to commit an indictable offence.

[19]        It is settled law that an arresting officer must have reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an indictable offence has been committed or is about to be committed (s. 495 Cr. C.) and that such grounds must be objectively justifiable.[4] There is also a subjective component to the requirement, in that the police officer must actually believe that s/he has sufficient grounds to proceed to an arrest[5].

[20]        The issue becomes more complex when several officers are involved in an arrest. Pursuant to R. v. Debot,[6] it is the police officer who makes the decision to arrest who must possess reasonable grounds, as opposed to an officer who simply executes the order. The information possessed by each individual officer cannot be combined or “pooled” in assessing reasonable and probable grounds. A decision to arrest made by an officer without sufficient grounds cannot be saved by the sufficient information possessed by another officer.

[21]        In this case, even accepting the appellant's proposition that only the information possessed by Detective Paquin must be assessed, that information is sufficient.

[22]        In R. v. Debot,[7] the Supreme Court of Canada held that information received from an informant can establish reasonable and probable grounds. Three factors must be weighed, each of them not constituting a separate test. It is the "totality of the circumstances" that must be considered. In other words, is the tip compelling, credible, and corroborated by police investigation?

[23]        The credibility of the informant is not really at issue in this case. Granted, he was paid for providing information. However, Detective Paul testified that he had received reliable information from the same source on six or seven prior occasions, even if arrests had not always ensued. The information was therefore provided by a sufficiently credible source.

[24]        The appellant submits that the "tip" was not sufficiently compelling. He contends that Detective Paquin had incomplete information, making it impossible to exclude the possibility of a simple coincidence or a mere rumour.

[25]        Detective Paquin knew the appellant's alias ("Miami Mike") as well as his basic physical description. He knew that "Miami Mike" was expected to meet three or four black men at that particular Tim Hortons restaurant on that particular date and at that particular time, to finalize plans for a "burn". He knew to expect a blue Chrysler 300. Even accepting that he may not have known the licence plate number, the information was sufficiently specific and compelling to warrant the attention of the police. It would be difficult to accept a police decision to do nothing in such circumstances.

[26]        Moreover, those details were amply confirmed by police surveillance. It is not necessary, as a general rule, that a tip be confirmed in its "criminal" aspect.[8] In this case, since the police knew the informant, it was unnecessary for the surveillance team to confirm details relating to the specific criminal activity being planned in order to justify the arrest. For the most part, the information received from the informant was confirmed: a blue Chrysler 300 carrying a white man and two black men arrived at the Tim Hortons on December 15, 2010, at the expected time. The occupants later talked with another black man who was waiting at the Tim Hortons. It could not be mere coincidence. Detective Paquin was told that they would imminently conduct a "burn"; he could consequently infer that they would be armed.

[27]        In short, considering the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person placed in the position of Detective Paquin would have had reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an indictable offence was about to be committed.

Aucun commentaire:

Publier un commentaire

Le dédommagement à la victime doit toujours être envisagé lors de la détermination de la peine

Les avocats doivent faire preuve d’une certaine retenue lors de leurs plaidoiries et concentrer leurs observations sur la preuve présentée lors du procès, car leur opinion sur la culpabilité ou l’innocence de l’accusé ne fait pas partie du débat (& directives sur les stéréotypes)

Kalymialaris c. R., 2024 QCCA 103 Lien vers la décision [ 23 ]        L’appelant reproche au juge d’avoir rendu une directive correctrice à ...